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The Theodicy of the Timaeus

T. M. Robinson, Univ. of Toronto
(for reading Dec. 28, 1990, Harvard room, Boston Marriott)
Given the controversy that has swirled around the
interpretation of the Timaeus from just about the time of
its appearance, I make no apologies for beginning any fresh
attempt to assess its purported theodicy with some brief
remarks on my methodology of interpretation of the dialogue
as a whole.
First, my general source of interpretation will be hints
that appear to emerge from the text itself, rather than
(though not to the exclusion of) a broad range of commentary
over the ages, ranging from the view that the description of
a supposed temporal beginning to the universe was elaborated
by Plato the way it was simply as a pedagogical device1 to
the view that the dialogue does not set out to expound
Plato’
s views at all.2 Xenocrates’
s view has for some time
now enjoyed large-scale, though not universal acceptance,
leading a significant number of scholars to write off the
Demiurge as symbolic rather than real.3 I myself take it as
a sound principle of interpretation that Timaeus is to be
understood literally except on those occasions (such as
34b-c) when he explicitly indicates that he is not to be so
taken, on the simple grounds that it makes no sense on
Plato’
s part to have gone out of his way so to indicate had
he intended the whole work to be understood in some
(unspecified) non-literal way. The resulting interpretation
of the dialogue in general and its theodicy in particular
1 The view is attributed by Aristotle to Xenocrates, De
Cáelo 279b 32-280a 1 ( = fr. 54 Heinze), and may also have
been held by Speusippus and left open as a possibility by
Theophrastus; for estimates of the evidence see A. E. Taylor
ad loe., H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the
Academy I (Baltimore 1944) n. 356; G. Vlastos, "The
Disorderly Motion in the Timaeus (1939)", in Studies in
Plato's Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London 1965 )( =
Vlastos I) 383 ff.; and L. Taran, "The Creation Myth in
Plato’
s Timaeus", in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy,
edd. John P. Anton and George L. Kustas, SUNY Press 1971,
nn. 140-143 (he adds Crantor to the list and possibly
Heraclides Ponticus).
2 The view espoused by A. E. Taylor.
3 For details see T. M. Robinson, Plato's Psychology
(Toronto 1970) 101, n. 20 and Richard D. Mohr, The Platonic
Cosmology (Leiden 1985) 40. More recent adherents to the
view include E. Ostenfeld (see below, n. 17) and G. Carone,
"Sobre el significado y el status del demiurgo del Timeo",
(Methexis 3 [1990]) 33-49).
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seem to me of at least as much philosophical interest as a
number of prevalent non-literal interpretations.
Turning to the theodicy, we can begin as Plato himself does
with a crucial metaphysical and epistemological distinction.
"We must, then," he says, "in my judgment, first make this
distinction: what is that which is always real and has no
beginning of existence, and what is that which comes into
existence and is never real?" (27d5-28a1). The translation
of the sentence is crucial. If at 27d6-28a1 the correct
reading is ti to gignomenon aei, we apparently have, "at the
top of the show", so to speak, a broad hint on Plato’
s part
that his interest in the subsequent discussion will be in an
eternal world of Forms and a co-eternal universe over and
against them, whatever the "temporal" drift of his own
narrative. As it happens, however, and as Whittaker pointed
out many years ago in a much-overlooked article,4 aei almost
certainly did not appear in Plato’
s argument: he was
instead simply setting the stage for the discussion, in the
immediately subsequent lines, not of the ontological status
of the eternal world of Forms and the eternal world of
genesis, but of the ontological status of any Form and any
sense-object and the implications thereof for that greatest
of all sense-objects (as he saw it), the universe itself.
The point is reinforced immediately by Plato in the very
next sentence, where a sense-object is described as
something that "comes into being and goes out of being"; no
manuscript carries a trace of any lost adverb aei.5 Which
is not, of course, to suggest that in the Timaeus Plato has
given up on the Republic doctrine that our world is a world
of genesis2 (= process), merely that in the present context
what he is describing is simply genesisi ( = beginning).
The stage for the argument is set in two rapid moves. First,
with the epistemological assertion, familiar to all readers
of the Republic, that one of the two objects - i. e., the
Form - is "apprehensible by insight, along with a rational
account", the other - i. e., the sense object - being "the
object of opinion, in conjunction with unreasoning
sensation" (28a1-4). Second, with the assertions a) that
anything that comes into existence must do so thanks to some
causal agent; b) that that agent uses a model to serve as
his paradigm in the fashioning process; c) that the only
two types of model possible are ones described respectively
as "everlastingly and unchangingly real" (i. e., Forms) and
ones that have "come into existence" (i. e., sense objects);
and d) that anything produced in accordance with the former
4 John Whittaker, Phoenix 23 (1969) 181-185 and 27 (1973)
387-388 2; cf. more recently John Dillon, AJP 1989 (1).
5 For further instances in which what would have been an
analogous aei is conspicuous by its absence see 28a1, 37b23, 48e6-49a1.
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class of model will be kalon, anything in accordance with
the latter class not so (28a4-b2).
With this as his basis (none of it new to readers of the
Republic) Plato can now construct an argument concerning the
universe. Having just divided the real into everlasting
objects and objects that have a beginning of existence, he
classifies the universe without further ado as belonging to
the latter class - i. e., as having had a beginning of
existence - on the grounds that "it can be seen and touched
and has body, and all such things are objects of sense"
(28b2-8).
Satisfied on the above grounds that the universe can be
reasonably described as a sense object and hence something
that came into existence, Plato then has no trouble positing
a causal agent to account for its coming into existence, an
agent he calls its "craftsman and father",6 a craftsman he
immediately admits it is hard to "discover" and impossible
to "declare" (= "satisfactorily describe"?) to every person
(28b8-c5).
A few final moves complete the argument. Like any other
causal agent, the world’
s craftsman too must have used one
of two available models, and Plato declares that it must
have been the one of an "everlasting" nature, on the grounds
a) that the universe is not only kalos but in fact "the most
kalos of things that have come into existence" and b) that
its craftsman is the "best of causal agents"; the contrary
supposition - i. e., that the Demiurge is not agathos and
the universe not kalos - is "something one cannot even
mention without blasphemy" (28c5-29a6).
A great deal has been said here by Timaeus in very short
compass, and we shall have to return to it. For the moment
however I wish only to stress that up to this point nothing
has been said one way or the other about whether he expects
his words to be construed literally or otherwise. But a
useful statement - wholly misconstrued by many scholars emerges as the argument concludes, to the effect that in the
matter of "gods and the beginning of the universe" (29c4-5)
we should accept the “likely story" (eikota mython) (29d2)
and nothing more.
Many7 have seen this reference, and
other, more frequent references in the dialogue to "likely
account" (eikos logos) as further evidence that Plato
expected his story - including the Demiurge episode - to be
understood figuratively, not literally, but the judgment is
premature. The word being stressed is "likely" (repeated
6 The terms are not ones that Timaeus confines rigidly to
efficient causes. At 50c he will compare Space to a mother,
the eternal Form to a father, and the universe they form
between them to offspring.
7 E. g., Cornford, 28 ff.
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later in the dialogue as "particularly likely", 44c7-d1, and
hot only "no less probable than another [account], but more
so", as far as Timaeus can make it, 48d1-3). As for the
phrase eikos mythos (found three times in the dialogue, as
against eight usages of the phrase eikos logos), it is in
context clearly a synonym for the phrase "likely account",
and to that degree a perfect instance of the use of mythos
in its wel1-authenticated neutral, non-fictional sense.8
The points are worth emphasising, since Cornford, convinced
as he is from the outset of the "mythological" status of the
Demiurge and his activities, has a habit of unwittingly so
translating to fit his preconceptions. At 29b5-c2c, for
example, he translates: "an account of that which is
abiding and stable and discoverable by the aid of reason
will itself be abiding and unchangeable ...while an account
of what is made in the image of that other, but is only a
likeness, will be itself but likely". The Greek however
simply reads "a likeness", not "only a likeness", and
s
"likely", not "but (i. e., merely) likely". Plato’
perfectly straightforward statement is subtly downgraded to
suggest that his account will turn out to be less
substantial than it seems, when in fact he is merely re
iterating a basic epistemological and metaphysical claim,
first seen in the Republic, that the world of sense
perception and its processes are the object of opinion not
knowledge, and that some opinions, while still remaining
opinions, are in fact sounder opinions than others. One
such "particular1y sound" opinion (see 44d1, malista
eikotos) is his account of the formation of the cosmos we
know by the Demiurge.
The desire by so many to explain away the Demiurge is, prima
facie, surprising, in view of the clear references to him in
the Republic, where he is called "the craftsman of the
senses" (507c6-7) and "the craftsman of the universe"
(530a6). Nor should it come as a surprise to readers of the
same dialogue that the craftsmanship of the universe, like
any other act of crafsmanship, will be founded on some sort
of rational plan (aitia, 29d7). This plan, it is said,
consists of the Demiurge’
s desiring that "everything come
into being <with attributes> as close as possible to <those
possessed by> himself"; a desire stemming immediately from
the fact that the Demiurge is "good", and "without phthonos"
("jealousy", or perhaps better "grudgingness" ). More
surprising, perhaps, is the statement that the above
principle concerning "a universe’
s coming into existence"9
8 See Vlastos I (above, n. 1) 380 ff.
9 The figure of speech I take to be hendiadys, as also
s
apparently at 29d7-e1 (genesin kai to pan tode). Cornford’
translation "becoming and the order of the world" is both an
an over-translation and a mistranslation, and once again
leaves the reader with the idea that Plato’
s purpose is to
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(literally: "coming into existence and a universe" [geneseos
kai kosmou]) is one that we would do rightly to accept from
"men of understanding"; whatever the trappings of rational
argument so far, this particular principle, for reasons left
unclear, is one apparently less immediately accessible to
the reasoning processes of the majority.
In light of the principle, the Demiurge’
s first actions are
described by Plato as follows (tr. Cornford, with some
changes):
1. "Since he wished all things to be good (agatha),10 and,
as far as possible, no thing to be imperfect, the god took
all that was visible11 - not at rest but moving in
discordant and unordered fashion - and made efforts to
reduce it12 from disorder to order, considering the latter
to be in all ways better than the former."
2. "Now it neither was nor is acceptable that he who is the
most good should bring about anything other than <what is
itself> the most kalon. 13 Weighing the matter, then, he
kept finding14 that, among things by nature visible, no
product devoid of intelligence will ever be more kalon than
one possessing intelligence, when each is taken as a whole,
and what is more that intelligence cannot possibly come to
be present in anything without <the prior presence of>
discuss the operations of (this) world of becoming, rather
than - as it purports to be - to discuss its supposed coming
into existence. Were he right, Plato’
s hendiadys would of
course have been reversed, and have read to pan tode kai
genesin rather than genesin kai to pan tode. Which is not
of course to deny that for the Plato of the Timaeus the
world which had a beginning (genesisi) was also a world
characterised by process (genesis2 ), but rather to suggest
that the examples of hendiadys found at 29d7-e8 and 29e4
cannot be read as references to such process.
10 The.word will again come as no surprise to readers of
the Republic, though it raises immediate questions as to the
role, if any, played by the Form of the Good in the scheme
of the Timaeus, and its possible relationship to the
Demiurge and his activities. On this see below, p. 8.
11 The tense is significant. Cornford characteristically
translates " is visible" (my italics), in line with his
understanding of Plato’
s intentions.
12 The tense is not aorist, but imperfect, underlining the
difficulties faced by the Demiurge in his task.
13 The reference (immediately above) to all things being
desired by the Demiurge to be good (agatha) suggests that by
kalon Plato means something nearer to that notion than to
that of simple physical beauty, so I leave it in
transíiteration.
14 See above, n. 12.
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soul.15 In view of this reasoning, he who put together the
universe made efforts, in doing so, to fashion intelligence
within soul and soul within body, so as to prove to have
fashioned a product as kalon and as excellent as it could by
nature be. This...is how we must say, according to the
likely account, that this world came into existence, by the
god’
s providence, in very truth a living creature with soul
and reason”.
As Cornford points out (p. 34), "the dialogue yields no more
information about the Demiurge" than is conveyed by the
above short account. We should therefore pause a while at
this juncture and make a preliminary assessment of what we
at any rate appear to have been told. It can be described in
summary form as follows:
1. The world, like any of its constituent parts or
contents, is a sense object, since it is seeable, touchable,
and possesses bulk, and is hence contingent for its
existence upon a causal agent other than itself.
2. Like all sense objects, it had a beginning of existence
and a maker/father.
3. The model to which this maker/father looked is an
eternal one, guaranteeing that the world itself will be
good; and the indisputable goodness of the world itself is
an argument for the eternal nature of its model.
4. The Demiurge is not only good, but the "best of causal
agentsv and the world he fashioned not only good but the
"best of things (worlds?) that have come into existence".
5. Over and against the Demiurge, apparently ab aeterno,
are not just the Forms but moving, onordered matter of some
sort, which at a certain point the Demiurge made successful
efforts to reduce to some type of order, producing the
cosmos we know.
6. On the principle that no product not possessing
intelligence is ever better than one that does, and that the
exercise of intelligence is contingent upon the <prior>
existence of soul, he made the world a living, intelligent
creature, possessed of soul, intellect and body.
Taking these points in turn:
1. As Taylor (pp. 69-70), picking up on point emphasized in
Kant’
s Critique of Pure Reason, indicated long ago,
Timaeus’
s argument is gravely weakened by the assumption
that the world is a sense object in the way, apparently,
that its parts or contents are sense objects. One can go
15

Literally, "apart from soul".
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further, in fact, and wonder whether any argument of the
sort could be valid if it assumes that the world is any type
of "object“at all, rather than a general concept indicating
the finite or infinite sum of what exists/is the case. As
so often, Plato’
s realism assumes the referential nature of
general terms and goes off in vain search of the putative
referent.
2. Given the basic philosophical weakness of the notion of
the world as sense object, Plato’
s further contention that
it is, like all sense objects, contingent - and apparently
temporally contingent16 - upon a causal agent other than
itself is pari passu shaky. But it has the great value, in
interpetational terms, of indicating clearly to the reader
that reductionist attempts to equate the Demiurge with the
world, or with the world’
s soul, or with the world’
s
intellect, could never have met his approval.17 If the
world, its soul and its intellect are all understood as
contingent, as they are indeed apparently understood, they
will always, according to Platonic doctrine, be dependent on
some prior principle to account for their existence, whether
the Demiurge is explained away or not, and whether the world
is eternal or not. If this is the case, reductionists must
find a reductee that is, as a minimum requirement,
unequivocally understood as non-contingent.
The only such candidate that has been brought forward, to
my knowledge, is the everlastingly self-activating soul
described in the Phaedrus and Laws X. This point will be
discussed later.
3. The model - the Eternal Living Creature - used by the
Demiurge in forming the universe is a clearly recognisable
Form, though one unmentioned in previous dialogues, where
its relevance would not in any case have been clear. And
like all Platonic Forms (excepting the Form of the Good) its
role and status is purely paradigmatic. It is also eternal,
16 Throughout this paper I shall be using the terms
contingent and non-contingent in their time-honoured
cosmological rather their current logical sense. I shall
also be using them in their weaker rather than in their
stronger sense, i. e., to express a relationship of
dependency, but without invocation of a supposedly necessary
being as explanation of a chain of existents. The basic
data of the real as described by Timaeus - the Demiurge,
Forms and Space - are just that apparently, data ; no
further claims in terms of their supposedly absolute - as
distinct from hypothetical - necessity are proffered.
17 See above, n. 3. Erik Ostenfeld, Forms , Matter and
Minds : Three Strands In Plato’
s Metaphysics (The Hague
1982) 246, suggests that the Demiurge is to be equated with
the Circle of the Same in the world’
s soul.
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as the Demiurge is presumably eternal, and neither one is
described as contingent for existence upon the other. So
further reductionist attempts to equate the Demiurge with
this (or any other) Form, except perhaps the Form of the
Good - on which later - can have Tittle chance of catching
Plato’
s intentions.
The analogue of Plato’
s vision is rather, as so often, to be
found in the Republic, where the philosopher-king (queen)
sets out to form a good society on the pattern of the Form
of the Good. But it is not an exact analogue, since the
Form of the Good is there credited with what appear to be
powers of efficient, not simply paradigmatic causality, and
to that degree the philosopher can indeed be said to be
contingent - if only at several removes - for existence
upon a Form. On the other hand, in the same dialogue the
Demiurge too is credited with efficient causality, leaving
Plato with a problem that could only be solved by a ruthless
exercise of Ockham’
s razor. That exercise is it seems
performed in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge is left as the
sole efficient cause of the world’
s formation, and the Form
of the Good, if it is to be found at al1, is reduced to the
paradigmatic status of all other Forms.
What of Plato’
s argument concerning the world and its
paradigm? There are it seems to me two major problems with
it.

a) It is unclear why the everlastingly unchanging status of
the Form Eternal Living Creature should guaranteee the
world’
s goodness rather than its status as a (contingent)
living creature. What is more, Timaeus has also apparently
opted to endow the Demiurge with the twin attributes of
efficient and paradigmatic causality previously enjoyed by
the Form of the Good ("he wanted everything to come into
being <with attributes> as close as possible to <those
possessed by> himself").
Matters are complicated further by the apparent continuance
in existence, in the Timaeus, of the Form of the Good, at
least as a standard (paradigmatic) Form, and at the level of
what now seems a mere cosmic whisper. In a much-overlooked
phrase at 46c7-d1 Timaeus says, "Now all these things are
among the accessory causes which the god uses as subservient
in bringing to completion (apotelon), as far as possible,
the form of the best". For no good reason that I can see
Taylor, followed by Cornford ("in achieving the best result
that is possible"), discounts the clear possibity, seen by
Archer-Hind, that we have here an echo of the notion of the
Form of the Good, but now playing the role of paradigm
rather than efficient cause.18
18 A minor problem attaching this scenario is the fact
that, were it the case, Plato would appear to finish up with
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b) Statements at 28a and 29a suggest that Timaeus has
either caught himself in the coils of a circular argument or
perhaps unwittingly affirmed the consequent. At 28a the
(hypothetical) argument runs:
If a craftsman looks to an everlastingly unchanging model,
the product will be one that is kalon; if to one*that has
come into existence, it will not be so.
So structured, the argument, had Timaeus completed it, would
- to be a valid (though not necessarily sound) one - have
concluded as follows:
The model the Demiurge uses is in fact everlastingly
unchanging.
Therefore the world he produces is kalon.
In fact we have to wait till 29a for Timaeus to return to
the matter, but this time he argues from the self-evident
kalTos of the world and goodness of its Demiurge (contrary
thoughts being deemed blasphemy) to the everlasting nature
of the model! Spelled out, the argument runs as follows:
If the world is kalos and its Demiurge agathos, the model
used will be everlasting; if the world is aischros and its
Demiurge kakos, it will not be so.
The world is kalos and its Demiurge agathos.
Therefore the model is everlasting.
But this of course will not do. The argument at 28a was
never completed, and the second antecedent of the argument
at 29a is based not on argument or observation but the fear
of being caught in blasphemy. Even were the first
antecedent soundly based, however, the consequent (i. e.,
that the model used will be everlasting) would still be far
from obvious, unless the reader were already convinced of
the validity of the previous argument begun but not finished
at 28a. But this argument never affirmed, let alone
attempted to prove, the critical antecedent that the world’
s
model is everlasting. So the reader is left with the
uncomfortable choice of accusing Timaeus of planning (but
not completing) the argument of 28a along the lines
suggested above, and hence of being caught in an egregious
piece of circular reasoning, arguing first from the
everlastingness of the model to the kaTTos of the world and
then from the kallos of the world to the everlastingness of
the model; or of planning to complete the argument
(fallaciously, unfortunate!y ) as follows:
three paradigms for the world’
s goodness, the Form of the
Good, the Eternal Living Creature and the Demiurge himself.
To which Plato might have replied, had the question been
put, that the significant quality of the Demiurge, in the
matter of world-making, is his causally efficient status;
whether the goodness of the world that got made had as its
paradigm the goodness exemplified by the Form of the Good or
by.the Form Eternal Living Creature or by the Demiurge or by
all three was of lesser moment.
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The world produced by the Demiurge is in fact kalon.
Therefore the model is everlastingly unchanging,
and so perhaps avoiding the charge of circular reasoning in
the combined arguments, but committing the fallacy of
affirming the consequent instead.
All this, of course, has to do with the validity of
Timaeus’
s arguments, not their soundness. Even were the
former granted, argumenti causa, the notion that the world
is self-evidently (to non-blasphemous people) kalos would
remain something of unclear philosophical foundation.
4. In view of the problems raised by the above, Timaeus
faces it seems even bigger hurdles with his further claim
that “
the world is the most kalon of things have come into
existence" and the Demiurge "the best of causal agents".
The latter claim could of course simply be true by
definition, the Demiurge playing the part of first and best
among the gods in the way Zeus is first and best among the
Olympians. And the former claim could have been based on
the assumption that the totality of kala is quite clearly
more kalon than any of its constituents. But the sceptic
would still press Timaeus to explain a) why and in what
precise sense the world is kalon rather than aischron
(and the Demiurge by the same token agathos rather than
aischros) and b) why the notion of the world as a sense
object on an ontological and epistemological par with its
own constituents is not the untenable outcome of a fallacy
of composition.
5.
Over and against the Demiurge lies a realm described by
Timaeus as "all that was visible - not at rest but moving in
discordant and unordered fashion". This is presented as a
cosmological datum, like the Demiurge and the Forms, and is
like them presumably to be understood as non-contingent;
every other item in the cosmology is described in terms of
contingency. Since there were no physical spectators of
this supposed pre-cosmos, the word "visible" is perhaps
surprising, but ultimately of little import; as early as
the Phaedo (79a6 ff.) Plato was apparently using the word as
a synonym for "physical". We shall return to the whole
question of the role and status of the pre-cosmos and its
components in Timaeus’
s scheme of things. Suffice it for
the moment to notice in passing that at this introductory
stage the stuff (for want of a better word) of which the
cosmos will eventually be formed is described as being - and
as presumably always having been - in chaotic motion; and
there is no hint of any alterum quid that might be
understood as the initial or ongoing source of that motion.
Nor is any reason offered at this stage why Demiurgic
intervention to reduce chaos to some sort of order took
place at one moment rather than another.
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6. As a paradigm19 himself apparently possessed of soul and
reason20 the Demiurge naturally imparts the same qualities
to his ordered universe, though Timaeus as it happens offers
as the reason the (far from obvious) supposition that no
thing not possessed of reason can ever be better (and the
best possible product is of course the Demiurge’
s objective)
than one that is; and taking it as self-evident that only
living things can reason, he sees the presence of soul, the
life-principle, as an indispensable condition for the
operation of reason, and in that sense logically if not
temporally prior to it. These claims are worth careful
study in themselves; for the moment we can simply note that
both soul and reason are described here in terms clearly
suggesting contingency, being as they are direct objects of
Demiurgic production. The same, it might be added, must be
said of the planetary, solar and lunar gods and the goddess
Earth; all are unequivocally described as being direct
Demiurgic productions.21
A central argument in favour of a non-literal interpretation
of the dialogue’
s creation account, including the role and
status of the supposed Demiurge, is the claim that, despite
19 See above, p.8.
20 A notion rightly defended by Vlastos, "Creation in the
Timaeus: Is It A Fiction?" in Studies in Plato's
Metaphysics, ed. R. E. Allen (London 1965) (= Vlastos II)
407, against Cherniss, op. cit. Appendix XI. ^ For a
restatement of the Cherniss position see Taran, art. cit. n.
34.
21 Despite this description, it has been suggested by
Cornford (280) that the ease with which in the final part of
the dialogue (69a ff.) Timaeus blurs the distinction between
the Demiurge and the gods of his formation is further
evidence of the mythical character of the formative powers
attributed to both.
A less drastic and surely more likely
explanation is that Timaeus, on the assumption that the said
gods, ever heedful of and obedient to their father’
s
commands (42e6-7), were at all times implementing the wishes
of the Demiurge, felt free to talk indifferently of their or
the Demiurge’
s activity, the crucial conceptual and real
difference between them having been made with clarity
earlier on. In the same way Timaeus, when the spirit moves
him, will use a vivid present tense in the midst of a
standard set of descriptive aorists (e.g., at 37d6, poiei ,
e3, mechanatai); or will indeed on one occasion (53c-66d)
dispense with all talk of divine construction when faced
with the task of covering a large mass of complex terrain in
a manageable amount of space and where a constant adversión
to detailed activity on the part of the gods would probably,
slow down the accomplishment of a more important objective the detailed description of such things as the actual
figures of the primary bodies, the nature of motion and
rest, and the like.
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the apparent contingency of the world’
s soul upon Demiurgic
production, there is one major statement in the dialogue of
the Phaedrus doctrine that all soul is self-activating
activity, or self-moving motion.22 To many this has
suggested that Timaeus’
s real view is that all soul is in
fact non-contingent, whatever the apparent thrust of the
rest of his account, and that as a result the Demiurge is a
superfluous entity, all of his productive activities being
easily ascribable to the world’
s soul, or perhaps to its
rational aspect.23 But this conclusion should it seems to
me be resisted, on a number of grounds.
1. It is far from obvious that the Phaedrus was written
prior to the Timaeus, as I have argued elsewhere. And if
it was indeed written later, it is methodologically risky to
import its doctrine of soul into an interpretation of the
earlier dialogue, unless the Timaeus itself has a clear
statement on the matter.
2. As far as the latter point is concerned, the crucial
evidence is found at 37b5, where Timaeus talks of discourse
being carried on "within the thing that is self-moved".
Cornford correctly24 elucidates this as a reference to "the
Heaven as a whole", but then adds, "which, as a living
creature, is moved by its own self-moving soul".
In some
non-technical sense, this may be thought to be self-evident;
Plato, like Aristotle after him, thought that a
distinguishing feature of animals was that, unlike plants,
they moved themselves (see, e. g., Tim. 77c4-5).
Such
self-movement is however merely contingent self-movement;
one needs an explicit argument to show that the soul which
lies at the source of such movement is itself self-moving in
a manner that is non-contingent. And no such doctrine is
found with clarity in Plato’
s works before the Phaedrus.25
22 Phdr. 245c ff., Tim. 37b5.
23 See above, n.3.
24 For Cherniss, "The Sources of Evil According to Plato",
PAPS 98 (1954) 26, n.24, the reference is to self-moving
soul, and he cites as evidence 37c3-5, especially the words
alio plen psychen. But this is far from clear. The passage
would appear rather to be about the universe which has a
soul (cf. the words autou ten psychen , 37b7), followed by a
description of a pair of prominent features of that soul
(37c5-7).
25 Cherniss {op. cit. 428) has argued that the following
passages in the Timaeus presuppose a doctrine of psychic
self-motion: 37b5, 77c4-5 and 89a1-5. But all of these
passages can be explained without difficulty as references
to a contingent form of self-movement; there is no hint of
the presence, even at the level of assumption, of the more
drastic and all-embracing Phaedrus doctrine of non
contingent self-movement.
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As far as the present passage is concerned, nothing can be
inferred from the fact that Timaeus uses, to describe the
world, the phrase "moved by itself" in a way not unsimilar
to the use of a phrase to describe soul in the Phaedrus, for
he goes on to clarify himself immediately afterwards by
talking of the world as "set in motion (kinethen) and
alive"; the passive voice is unequivocal, and sure evidence
s view
that the world's self-motion is in Timaeus’
contingent. Nothing has been said, or even hinted at,
concerning the soul of the world —
whether it is itself
self-moving, and whether, if so, its self-motion is of the
contingent or non-contingent variety.
The fact is that all Timaeus needs for his argument to go
through at this point is a notion of soul as possibly selfmoving - but if so merely in the commonplace sense that
animals are said to be self-moving - but in any case merely
contingently so,26 and this is of course exactly in line
with his earlier description of the world’
s soul as being of
direct Demiurgic construction. In a later dialogue Plato
will come back to the question of soul, and will attribute
to all (rational) soul27 the quality of non-contingent self26 The phrase used by Cornford (95, n.2) to describe soul to heauto kinoun - is of course taken from the Phaedrus, and
is nowhere to be found in the Timaeus, with or without the
world’
s soul as its ostensible referent. On the two single
occasions when the world-soul’
s motion is referred to in the
dialogue, at 37a6-7 and 37c6, the voice is passive, not
middle, as Cornford’
s own translations concede: "whenever
(the world’
s soul) is in contact with anything that has
dispersed existence or with anything whose existence is
indivisible, she is set in motion all through herself...";
and "when the father who had begotten it saw it set in
motion and alive..." (my italics).
27 As Hermias saw, the argument at Phdr. 245c refers to
rational soul only. It is also significant that it refers
to the totality of soul, whereas the Timaeus does no such
thing; the soul possessed by the Demiurge cannot be argued,
as it is argued by Taran, art. cit. 394 n. 30, to possess of
necessity the same constituents as the world’
s soul and
hence to be clearly one and the same as it. (The argument
is based on an assumption that the Platonic doctrine of soul
is a uniform one, but this is of course the very question in
dispute.) The whole point of the description of the world’
s
soul is to demonstrate its contingent self-motion and its
"intermediate" metaphysical and epistemological status; the
Demiurge, by contrast, is a non-contingent datum of the
real, and no more "intermediate" than those other non
contingent data , Space and the Forms. What Timaeus would
have said about the composition of his psyche we do not
know, but it seems hard to doubt that, had he wished to
spell out the details of the activity of that psyche, he
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motion which in the Timaeus would appear to characterise
merely the soul of the Demiurge.
A number of very careful pieces of linguistic usage
concerning the concept of duration are further evidence, it
seems to me, of how anxious Timaeus is to maintain a real
and critical distinction between the Demiurge, the world of
Forms, Space, and the world and its soul.*28 To the world of
Forms, and uniqely to the world of Forms, he applies the
neologism diaionios, to signify a type of eternal existence
in which no manner of kinesis exists or is a possibility.
Space and the Demiurge, by contrast, being co-eternal with
the Forms, merit, along with them, the description aei
einaif but differ from them and from each other in their
being subject to kinesis, in the case of the Demiurge the
kineseis of thought and desire, in the case of Space its own
particular shaking motion and that of its contents (52e3-4).
The formed world and its soul are not eternal but
everlasting, in the sense of having duration without end but
with a beginning in time. For this manner of duration
Timaeus studiously avoids the use of aei and the verb to be,
talking instead of "abiding (menein ) forever" (the astral
gods are so described at 40b6) or of being "in motion
forever" (at 58c3 he talks of the aei kinesis of the four
primary bodies), or of "existing perpetually throughout all
time" (at 38c2-3 the formed universe is so described), or of
making a "divine beginning of ceaseless and intelligent life
for all time" (at 36e4-5 the world’
s soul is so described).
Locutions like the above keep clear metaphysical
cosmological distinctions that can easily become
particularly given the ambiguities of the adverb
their help as fail-safe devices, one can draw up
following schema:

and
blurred,
aei. With
the

1. Aei with einai is used strictly for eternal duration,
and applies to the Forms, the Demiurge, and Space.
2. Aei with menein is used strictly of everlastingness, and
applies to the formed world, its soul, and the time whereby
this manner of duration is measured. For the duration of
the four primary bodies the analogous locution is aei
kineisthai. (Menein without aei , by contrast, is used of
strictly eternal duration, describing Eternity itself at
37d6 [menontos en hem'] and at 42e5-6 the eternal wont of
the Demiurge’
s nature.)
would have described it in terms that we would recognise as
clearly non-contingent self-movement.
28 For a more detailed discussion of the matter see T. M.
Robinson, "The Timaeus on Types of Duration", Illinois
Classical Studies 11 (1986) 143-151.
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3. In problematic instances the possibility that aei will
mean “invariably”, "on each and every occasion" or something
similar has to be carefully investigated. At 49d4-5, for
example, Timaeus is not talking of what is perpetually
changing, but of "whenever we see something coming into
being". (Cf. also e5, e7-8: "that which invariably recurs
as similar", "that in which each of them invariably
appears"). And at 52a6 he is not talking about what is
perpetually in motion but of what is "invariably the subject
of phora".29
4.
As far as the famous gignomenon men aei of 27d6-28a1 is
concerned, if (as I doubt) aei happens to be the correct
reading, it could, as Cherniss (?) followed by Vlastos have
pointed out, just as well refer to everlasting as to eternal
duration;2930 there is no clearly analogous passage in the
Timaeus to tip the balance in favour of one or other
interpretation.
A further attempt to collapse Demiurge and the world’
s soul
(or the rational part of it) turns on two suppositions:
a) the view that the circles of the Same and Different in
the world’
s soul represent rationality and irrationality
respectively;
b) the complementary view that the irrational motions of the
traces of matter in the supposed pre-cosmos have as their
source eternally self-moving soul (cf. Phdr. 245c). Their
supposed reduction to order by the Demiurge is in fact their
evolution (in part) to rational order, the result being the
part-rational part-irrational soul of the world known to us
by sense-perception, their rationality and irrationality
being described (see [a] above) as the movements of the Same
and Different within them respectively.
To take the second view first. Part of its prima facie
plausibility lies in the fact that Ananke (Necessity), the
countervailing force to Reason in the world’
s formation, is
apparently persuaded by Reason "to guide the greatest part
of things that come to be towards what is best" (48a2-3),
with the result that it would appear to be describable as an
entity possessing a soul with at least as much plausibility
as has been asseverated of the Demiurge. And if a soul, why
not the irrational stage/part/aspect of the world's soul, in
the way that the Demiurge has been described by some as its
rational part/aspect? On such a scenario, eternal self29 The translations criticized are those of Cornford,
followed by Erik Ostenfeld, "Plato’
s Development and the
Date of the Timaeus", Classics et Mediaevalia 38 (1986) 70
n. 29.
30 Cherniss, op. cit. 420, Vlastos II (above, n..21) 407.
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moving soul will emerge as eternally part-rational partirrational; appropriate!y hard-headed demythologisation
will expose for what they are a supposedly personal
Demiurge, a supposedly personal Necessity, and a supposedly
temporal sequence in world’
s soul from wholly irrational to
a part-irrational part-rational stage.
There are however large problems with this. While it is
true that Timaeus uses the language of persuasion in talking
of Necessity, he also carefully distinguishes what is
wrought (dedemiourgemena) by Reason from what comes about
(gignomena) through Necessity (47e4-5). As for the traces
of matter in the pre-cosmos, he elsewhere (53b2-4) describes
them as "altogether in such a condition as we should expect
when deity is absent from it"; this presumably means any
deity, including a supposedly personified Necessity.
But Timaeus has as it happens a much more positive argument
at his disposal to indicate what really causes the
sempiternal movement of the traces of matter. At 57e ff. we
read :
"motion will never exist in a state of homogeneity. For it
is difficult, or rather impossible, that what is to be moved
should exist without that which is to move it, or what is to
cause motion (to kineson) without that which is to be moved
by it. In the absence of either, motion cannot exist; and
they cannot possibly be homogeneous. Accordingly, we must
always presume rest in a state of homogeneity, and attribute
motion to a state of heterogeneity (anomoloteta). Further,
inequality (anisotes) is a cause of heterogeneity, and the
origin of inequality we have already described". (Tr.
Cornford)
As I have put it elsewhere:31
"While for an instant the reader may imagine that the
kineson mentioned here will be an existent of some sort like, say, psyche - the subsequent references, in the same
passage, to anisotes and anomolotes make it clear that Plato
is referring to particular conditions under which, according
to the passage in question, the "primary bodies" operate.
As it happens, exactly the same conditions obtain, as
Cornford sees (p. 240), for the movements in Space of the
dynameis of the pre-cosmos, which are described as "neither
alike nor evenly balanced" (met/?’homoion... mete
isorropon), as having "no equipoise within any region of it"
(kat ’ouden autes isorropein), and "everywhere swayed
unevenly" (anómalos pantei talantoumenen). The natural
conclusion to be drawn from this can only be that, just as
the eternal equipoise of a given Form (or of the World of
Forms as a whole) is the basis of its/their eternally
31

T. M. Robinson, art. cit. (above, n. 29) 39.
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unchanging state, the sempiternal lack of such equipoise
among the dynameis of pre-matter accounts for their
sempiternal kinesis; no further doctrine of a supposed
presence of psyche need be imported."
Finally, it is worth mentioning again that the argument of
Phaedrus 245c refers, as Hermias saw, to rational soul only;
it is only later, in the Laws , that Plato’
s argument is
apparently extended to cover all psyche . It is therefore
particularly hazardous, even on the (to me mistaken)
assumption that the Phaedrus in fact antedates the Timaeus,
to use the argument of Phaedrus 245c as evidence for the
existence, in the Timaeus, of a world’
s soul which is
supposedly part-rational part-irrational.
Where, on the same assumption concerning dating, the
Phaedrus argument might be used effectively (and this brings
us to point [a] above, p. 15) is in the matter of the
composition and activity of the world’
s soul. While many
commentators have assumed that its "intermediate"
composition and the activity of the circles of Same and
Different within this soul express in some fashion its
combined rationality and irrationality, a careful reading of
the argument of Timaeus, as Skemp sees, makes it clear that
in its composition and activities it is wholly rational;
the two circles Same and Different are there, as are the
"intermediate" versions of Existence, Sameness and
Difference, as devices to assure the epistemological and
metaphysical possibility of true positive and negative
statements about the realms of both Forms and sense objects.
As Timaeus himself puts it, to conclude his argument: "And
the soul... revolving within its own limit, made a divine
beginning of ceaseless and intelligent life for all time."
(36e2-5)
If this is the case, those who take the Phaedrus to antedate
the Timaeus might wish to argue that the world’
s soul, as
described in the Timaeus, is in fact that (wholly rational)
eternally self-moving soul described in the Phaedrus, and on
these grounds continue to urge the excision of the Demiurge
in favour of such a soul, ön the grounds that the former’
s
role is now clearly superfluous. But this argument in turn
will not do, since it cannot account for the clear
s soul as
description, in the Timaeus, of the world’
contingent, for its existence and operations, upon an entity
- whatever that entity might turn out to be - other than
itself. Making the two of them co-eternal does not help,
for the contingency-relationship remains, rendering a purely
reductionist interpretation very implausible.
What I have myself been suggesting is that any explanation
of the Demiurge that has a chance of being correct must take
into account the fact that he is invariably described in
non-contingent terms, and the entities to which many have
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wished to reduce him (the world’
s soul, or the rationality
within it) in invariably and unambiguously contingent
terms.32
This holds true despite Timaeus’
s readiness to
speak without apparent qualm of the Demiurge as either a
father or a craftsman or both, or even - after the manner of
Anaxagoras - to talk of him on occasion simply as Reason33;
whatever the variants in the overall description of him,
nothing is ever said to detract from the basic assertion
that he is the world’
s non-contingent rational orderer, and
qua rational also of course himself ensouled.34 To that
degree he is the first instance of that psychic self
movement which in the Phaedrus Plato will later argue to be
a feature of a 11 rational soul.35
As a rider to the above, the notion of the world other than
the Demiurge, the Forms and Space as being contingent, a
notion so critical to my argument, is it seems to me re
inforced by a correct reading of the much-misunderstood use
of the verb pherein at 48a7 (cf. 43a7). In introducing the
causal nature of Necessity in the origin of the world
Timaeus says: "If, then, one is really going to tell how
the world has come into existence on the above principle,
32 I pass over the attempts to equate the Demiurge with a
Form, such as the Form of the Good, or the Form Eternal
Living Creature. While it is true that he occasionally
describes himself in paradigmatic terms - see above, p.8 this is easily subsumed within his more important role of
efficient cause that is both good and alive. At no point
does Timaeus hint that his relationship to the Forms is
anything other than the relationship between the Forms and
any other rational agent in dialogues such as the Phaedo and
Republic, i. e., a relationship between two separate
entities, the one a really existing paradigm and the other a
really existing - and different - mind.
33 47e ff.
34 See Tim. 46d5-6.
35 It has been argued by Ostenfeld, op. cit. xxx, that at
Tim. 30b soul is said to exist only in body, and that this
constitutes yet another argument against the supposedly real
existence of the Demiurge. But no such strong statement is
to be found at Tim. 30b. All that Timaeus says is that the
Demiurge, "when he framed the universe, fashioned reason
within soul and soul within body".
This was not because
soul and body are invariably conjoined but because the
Demiurge wanted the physical universe to be alive and
rational as well as physical. The passage explicitly states
that it is dealing with "things that are by nature visible,"
30b1 (i e., material; see above p.10) and to that degree
clearly excludes the Demiurge. On the other hand, Ostenfeld
has argued an interesting case for a generalised doctrine in
Plato’
s later dialogues to the effect that soul is
invariably embodied, which seems to me basically correct
provided one excludes the Timaeus from the schema.
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one must also bring in the character of the Wandering Cause
- how it is its nature to sustain (pherein)". In context
this will presumably mean "sustain in motion" the traces of
matter in the pre-cosmos. While the traces of matter,
thanks to their anomolotes (see above), are in contingent
sempiternal motion, a matrix (hedra , 52b1) - Space, the
Wandering Cause - is necessary (hence its further
description as Necessity)36 as a non-contingent sustainer of
such motion. As in the case of the Demiurge and the soul of
the world, Timaeus with his usual care keeps radically
separate a further non-contingent item in his cosmology and
that which cannot account for itself without the logically
prior existence of such an item.37
36 While there is force in Cornford’
s argument that the
Necessity of the Timaeus is the necessity of indispensable
condition, it is also the necessity involved in non
contingent sustainment (cf. the use of the terms hedra and
pherein). In physical rather than modal terms it is
described as Space, and in terms of its role in the scheme
of things as the so-called Wandering Cause, that is, that
cause of the sempiternal sustention in motion of the traces
of matter within it thanks to the fact that it is itself
forever in motion.
Put somewhat differently, Space is both
hypothetically necessary if the Demiurge wishes to form a
universe and a datum of Timaeus’
s eternal, non-contingent
tri-form reality (Demiurge, Forms, Space) whether a formed
world comes into being or not. While its causality is of
the type Timaeus elsewhere describes as producing its
"sundry effects at random and without order" (46e5-6),
enough order is nonetheless thereby mechanically produced
(53a) to suggest why the Demiurge could finally "persuade"
it, in the guise of its modal role as Necessity, to take the
next step and "guide the greatest part of the things that
come into existence towards what is best" (48a2-3).
37 Cornford translates pherein in the passage as "to cause
motion", and cites as parallels [PI.] Epin. 983b and Tim.
43a7. But neither passage suits the purpose. At Tim. 43a7
the circuits in. the body did not "cause and suffer violent
motions" but rather were rather "violently borne along by
and bore along" (biai epheronto kai epheron) that "great
river" which constitutes the body. (Analogously, Space both
moves and is moved by its own contents, 52e4-5.) And at
Epin. 983b God does not first put life into a body and then
"make it move as he has thought best" (tr. Harward, followed
by Cornford and Taran) but rather "sustain(s) it in motion
(pherein) as he has thought best". The natural sense of
pherein , here as elsewhere, is "support"(of a pedestal
bearing a statue) or "carry" (of a ship carrying
passengers). And as such it is very well suited to Plato’
s
purpose of underlining the relationship of contingency
between particular items in his cosmology. Other examples
of the usage are: (of sense objects) "invariably the object
of phora" (pephoremenon aei, 52a6); (of the two motions
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assigned to the stars) one uniform in the same place "the
other a forward motion, as each is subjected to the circular
carrying-motion (periphoras) of the Same", 40b1-2; (of an
image) that it is "invariably borne along (aei pheretai) as
a semblance of some other thing", 52c3; and (of eternal
being) that it is "characterised by no attribute that
Genesis attached to things borne along (pheromenois) in <the
world of?> sense," 38a5-6. Loose translations in terms of
"movement" unwittingly blur a crucial aspect of Timaeus’
s
argument.

